Client protection on European financial markets – from inform your client to know your product and beyond : an assessment of the PRIIPs Regulation, MiFID II/MiFIR and IMD 2 by Schaeken Willemaers, Gaëtane
Available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/152079
[Downloaded 2019/04/19 at 10:19:28 ]
"Client protection on European financial markets – from
inform your client to know your product and beyond : an
assessment of the PRIIPs Regulation, MiFID II/MiFIR and IMD 2"
Schaeken Willemaers, Gaëtane
Abstract
This article aims at assessing some of the most recent developments in European
law which are said to improve clients’ protection buying on European financial
markets. It focuses on (a) provisions relating to pre-contractual and marketing
information obligations, and related liability, supervision and sanction regimes, (b)
developments in product governance arrangements which are meant to reduce
potential risks of failure to comply with investor protection rules and on (c) “product
intervention powers” of supervisory authorities, considered as the last resort
measure for investor protection purposes. This article concludes that European
regulators move in the right direction where they focus on point-of-sale regulation
and product governance arrangements. This article also stresses that appropriate
rules should go hand in hand with a change of culture to bring back ethos
at manufacturers’ and distributors’. Not only the letter of the rules, but more
fundamentally, the spiri...
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I. Introduction
Retail investors are encouraged to invest on European finan-
cial markets. Their investments contribute to finance the eco-
nomy.2 Their investments should also help them build or
simply protect their wealth for health, education and retire-
ment needs at a time where they should expect less from
governments.
This political encouragement could not go without regulators
dedicating particular attention to their protection. Indeed,
compared to the product manufacturer and the financial
intermediary, they are the “weak party” on financial markets.
Their lack of appropriate competence to understand the risks
related to their investments, their limited cognitive capabili-
ties and their behavioral biases could all lead to disastrous
investment decisions, with great social and economic impacts.
Well-thought rules and regulations contribute to build their
confidence to make retail financial markets a success.
The regulations analyzed in this article were inspired in some
respects by the works done at international level. After the
financial crisis, international regulatory bodies focused pri-
marily on the sale of “structured products” to retail investors.
IOSCO suggested a toolkit outlining regulatory options to
regulate retail structured products along the value chain of
the product, from issuance to distribution to investment.3
ESMA issued good practices to national competent authori-
ties for product governance arrangements for structured
retail products, with the belief that “sound product gover-
nance arrangements are fundamental for investor protection
purposes, and can reduce the need for product intervention
actions by competent authorities”.4 They were inspired in part
by the joint position of the European Supervisory Authorities
on manufacturer’s product oversight and governance proces-
ses which aim at strengthening manufacturer’s internal
controls prior to product launch.5
Immediately after the financial crisis, the European Commis-
sion focused on stabilizing financial markets and the banking
sector.6 It then turned to address retail financial markets
weaknesses. Stories of mis-sellings of financial products are
indeed numerous.7 In an effort to reduce or even avoid them,
European instances issued what some refer to as a regulatory
tsunami. This article aims at assessing some of the most recent
developments in European law which are said to improve
clients’ protection buying on European financial markets. It
focuses on (II) provisions relating to pre-contractual and
marketing information obligations, 8 and related liability,
supervision and sanction regimes, 9 (III) developments in
product governance arrangements which are meant to reduce
potential risks of failure to comply with investor protection
rules and on (IV) “product intervention powers” of supervi-
sory authorities, considered as the last resort measure for
investor protection purposes.10
Given its sectoral approach for financial regulation, the Euro-
pean Union introduced distinct regimes for banking, securi-
ties and insurance. This article is concerned with financial
products that have an investment element, including
investment-based insurance products (“IBI products”).11 It
stresses the similarities and differences to assess whether
there is a “level playing field” between competing (or substi-
tutable) products in terms of protection of investors’ best
interests.
This article concludes that European regulators move in the
right direction where they focus on point-of-sale regulation
and product governance arrangements. This article also stres-
ses that appropriate rules should go hand in hand with a
change of culture to bring back ethos at manufacturers’ and
distributors’. Not only the letter of the rules, but more funda-
mentally, the spirit of the rules should be complied with at
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
1 Researches for this contribution were made until 1st July 2014.
2 The size of the European market of packaged retail and insurance-based
investment products was valued at approximately Q10 trillion by the Euro-
pean Commission in the context of researches relating to the PRIIPs
Regulation. Outstanding amounts of structured products – a sub-category
of PRIIPs – sold to retail investors in the European Union accounted for
around Q 770 billion at end-2012 according to ESMA, Economic report,
Retailisation in the EU, 3 July 2013, at 15 (citing structuredRetailProducts-
.com).
3 IOSCO, Regulation of retail structured products, Final Report, December
2013.
4 ESMA, Opinion – Structured retail products – Good practices for product
governance arrangements, 27 March 2014, at 2. This opinion covers inter
alia product design, target market, distribution strategy and product tes-
ting. See also, ESMA, Investor warning – Risks of investing in complex
products, 7 February 2014 (setting out the different risks).
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
5 Joint position of the European Supervisory Authorities on manufacturer’s
product oversight and governance processes, JC-2013-77, 28 November
2013 (senior management to take responsibility for compliance with the
product governance processes ; target market ; product testing ; distribu-
tion strategy ; periodic monitoring of the product).
6 See, inter alia, the new framework for financial supervision and oversight
of systemic risk, the regulation on derivatives, the new capital require-
ments directive, the alternative investment fund managers directive, and
the new credit rating agencies regulation.
7 Q 2 trillion of losses were sustained between end of 2007 and end of 2008 in
the European packaged retail investment products’ market.
8 Specific disclosure obligations relating to conflicts of interests and remu-
nerations are outside the scope of this contribution. So is client reporting.
9 This contribution will have a companion article to be published in 2014 in
the Revue Internationale des Services Financiers. The latter will look at
some of the most recent developments in Belgian law in the topics covered
here to assess to what extent they are compatible with (existing or forthco-
ming) European law.
10 This article thus leaves aside other important investor protection topics,
including independent advice and remuneration arrangements.
11 This article therefore does not consider banking products, including the
consumer credit directive.
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each level of the distribution chain. Only that combination
will bring back investors’ confidence for the long-term.
II. The PRIIPs Regulation
1. Background
The final report of the behavioural study commissioned by
the European Commission in 2010 suggested that simpler and
standardised product information could greatly improve
European consumers’ investment decisions.12
On 3 July 2012, the European Commission published a pro-
posal for a Regulation on “Key Information Documents” for
investment products.13 On 4 April 2014, the Council of the
European Union announced it reached political agreement
with the European Parliament, which formally adopted the
text at a plenary vote on 15 April 2014, effectively ending the
legislative process. The final, marked-up approved compro-
mise text was also published online and is referred to in this
contribution.14
The PRIIPs Regulation forms an important part of the Com-
mission’s wider package of proposals on the regulation of
PRIIPs. It complements the investor protection measures on
investment advice and sales services that are being extended
to apply to all products covered by the PRIIPs Regulation
under MiFID II15 and IMD 2.16
2. Scope
Despite the European Parliament’s attempts to extend the
scope of the PRIIPs Regulation, 17 the Regulation will apply
only to “packaged retail investment products” and to
“insurance-based investment products”.18 It will only apply
when products are sold to retail investors.19
To be a “packaged product”, investors must be exposed to
fluctuations in the market, rather than obtaining a simple
interest rate for instance. By way of example, such fluctua-
tions might be due to exposure to reference values or to the
performance of one or more assets which are not directly
purchased by the investor. In other words, some sort of
“wrapping” mechanism, e.g., pooling of capital, use of deriva-
tives, or reference rates, must intervene between them and
the market.
The investment component of the product means that the
product must offer medium-to-long term capital accumula-
tion that beats the risk-free rate, typically by combining expo-
sures to multiple underlying assets. Individual PRIIPs may
offer additional features, e.g., capital guarantees or insurance.
Broadly speaking, PRIIPs can be categorised into four
groups : investment funds, IBI products, retail structured
securities and structured term deposits.20 The definition of
PRIIPs includes UCITs and other investment funds, 21 all
structured products, whatever their form (packaged as insu-
rance policies, funds, securities, structured deposits further to
their MiFID II definition, or banking products), insurance
products whose surrender values are determined indirectly by
returns on the insurance company’s own investments or even
the profitability of the insurance company itself (including
with-profits), as well as derivative investments and some ins-
truments issued by Special Purpose Vehicles. The PRIIPs
Regulation also captures those investment products that may
not have a packaged element but describe themselves as
“guaranteed” where the investment return may vary, or even
where all or a portion of the investment return is guaranteed.
PRIIPs exclude products with no investment risk (products
where the precise rate of return is set in advance for the entire
life of the product) ; 22 deposits other than structured depo-
sits ; non-life insurance products, or life insurance products
where the benefit is payable only on death or in respect of
incapacity due to injury, sickness or infirmity, as any surren-
der value of those products will not be exposed to market
fluctuations ; pension products which provide an investor
with an income in retirement and entitle the investor to
certain benefits, and occupational pension schemes covered
by the Occupational Pensions Funds Directive or the Sol-
vency II Directive ; 23 and pension products for which a
financial contribution from the employer is required by natio-
nal law and where the employee has no choice as to the
pension product provider.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
12 Decision Technology Ltd, Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Invest-
ment Services : A Behavioral Economics Perspective, Final Report,
November 2010, at 19.
13 The history of the PRIIPs initiative dates back at least to 2009, where,
contrary to the text eventually published and which focuses on disclosure,
point-of-sale regulation was contemplated. See for more details, G. Schae-
ken Willemaers, Product Intervention : a European perspective, in Laure
Nurit-Pontier and Stéphane Rousseau (dir.), Risques, crise financière et
gouvernance : perspectives transatlantique, Montréal/ Zurich/Limal, Édi-
tions Thémis/Schulthess/Anthémis, 2013, at 25.
14 See position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 15
April 2014 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2014 of
the European Parliament and of the Council on key information docu-
ments for packaged retail and insurance based investment products-
(PRIIPs).
15 See the definition of “financial instruments” in Annex 2 C MiFID II which
covers PRIPs.
16 See below for full references to these directives.
17 During trialogue negotiations, the European Parliament proposed almost
400 pages of amendments, including a massive extension of scope whereby
the Regulation would cover all retail investments.
18 Note that the compromise text uses the term “PRIPs” next to the word
“PRIIPs”. But “PRIPs” now means something different to what it used to.
“PRIPs” in the new text now just means “PRIIPs” minus insurance-based
investments (which were included in the original definition of “PRIPs”).
This contribution will use “PRIIPs” throughout when referring to all retail
investments, insurance or otherwise, covered by the Regulation.
19 See below.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
20 See European Commission, Key Information Documents (KIDs) for pac-
kaged retail investment and insurance products - Frequently asked ques-
tions, 15 April 2014.
21 During a transitional period of 5 years, UCITS will continue to use the
KIID provided in the UCITS directive as they do today. After that 5-year
period, the relevant KIID provisions shall be repealed from the UCITS
directive or maintained but aligned. There is also a possibility to extend the
transitional period. This will follow a review of the effectiveness of the
Regulation which is set to take place 4 years after its implementation.
22 Any securities exchangeable or convertible into shares or other securities
will not fall within this exclusion.
23 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insu-
rance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (recast), Official Journal, 17 Decem-
ber 2009, L 335/1. It will come into force on 1 January 2016.
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3. The KID
3.1. Who to draft ?
Product manufacturers are responsible for drawing up (and
keeping up-to-date) a KID, and publishing it on their website
before a PRIIP can be made available to retail investors.
Preparation of the KID can be delegated to a third party, but
the manufacturer will still remain liable for any failings. The
European Parliament’s suggestion that manufacturer and dis-
tributor should both be responsible for drawing up the KID
was ultimately abandoned. “Manufacturers” also includes
anyone who has made substantive changes to an existing-
PRIIP including, but not limited to, altering its risk and
reward profile or the costs associated with an investment in
the PRIIP, for instance by combining products.
3.2. When to provide ?
3.2.1. Ex-ante notification to competent
authorities
It is up to Member States to require in national law provisions
product manufacturers to provide competent authorities with
copies of every KID before commencing any marketing acti-
vities (ex-ante notification). The European Parliament’s sug-
gestion that competent authorities should need to sign-off
every KID before a product can be marketed was, however,
ultimately abandoned in the final text, as was the proposed
requirement that manufacturers should regularly (re)assess
the suitability of products for the needs of retail investors via
a “documented product approval process”.24
3.2.2. Provision to retail investors
The KID must be provided before concluding a sale.
The Regulation provides for one limited exception to ex-ante
provision of the KID, if certain conditions are met.25 The KID
will then have to be provided without undue delay, after the
conclusion of the transaction. This will apply in case of unso-
licited distance sale where the ex-ante provision of the KID is
not possible and the retail investor consents to the ex-post
provision of the KID.
Detail on the timing for providing disclosure is intended to be
further developed in Level 2 measures.
3.3. Who to provide and to whom ?
Product distributors/advisers – including the product manu-
facturer for direct sales – must “provide”26 the KID to retail
investors. Product manufacturers will have to set up dedica-
ted KID websites where the library of KIDs will be contained
in order for distributors to be able to provide them to retail
clients.27 They will also have to ensure it is clear between
themselves and their distributors who has the responsibility
for providing the KID to retail investors.28
It is not required to be provided to any investor other than
“retail investors” 29 or to a person with written authority to
make investment decisions on behalf of that investor.30 This
means that the product must be meant to retail investors. This
is something determined at the point of sale, and not by
reference to the manufacturer’s intentions – although no-one
would need to prepare a KID for a product which is never
going to be sold to retail investors.
3.4. What to provide ?
The KID is a stand-alone document, separate from marketing
material and any other disclosures required under other regi-
mes which will continue to exist in parallel. The KID consti-
tutes pre-contractual information and must be accurate, fair,
clear and not misleading. It must provide key information and
be consistent with all other information about the PRIIP.31
The Regulation also sets out principles for style and presen-
tation. The KID must be short and non-technical, a maximum
of three A4-sized paper, use characters of readable size and
be presented in a common format allowing investors to com-
pare details of different PRIIPs. It shall not contain cross-
references to marketing material. It may contain cross-
references to other documents including a prospectus where
applicable, and only where the cross-reference is related to
the information required to be included in the KID by the
Regulation. The Regulation specifies in detail the content of
the KID ; the order in which it should be arranged ; and even
some of the required boilerplate text and section headings.32
Regulatory technical standards (“RTS”) will be adopted to
further detail the content and presentation of the KID, inclu-
ding disclosures of risks and costs for specific types of PRIIPs.
The information in the KID must be kept up-to-date. This
requires frequent review of the KID and updated disclosure
where there has been a change to the PRIIP.
Details on the frequency of the review and the conditions for
updating disclosure are to be further developed in Level 2
measures.
3.5. How to provide ?
The means of providing the KID are also detailed in the
Regulation : paper, 33 or, where certain conditions are met, 34
other durable medium or website.35
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
24 But see the product approval process in MiFID II (below).
25 Article 12, 2a of the compromise PRIIPs Regulation.
26 Like under the UCITs directive, it is not sufficient to make the KID
“available” to retail clients.
27 And one should make sure the hyperlinks on the website work.
28 Where the distributors/advisers consider they are not responsible for
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
providing the KID (because they act as agent for the product provider),
they should make sure this is reflected in their distribution arrangements.
29 Defined as “retail clients” further to MiFID II and as “customers” further
to IMD (to the extent these customers cannot be considered as “professio-
nal clients” under MiFID).
30 Where a discretionary manager invests in a PRIIP for a retail client
account, the obligation is satisfied by providing the KID to the discretio-
nary manager.
31 Article 6 of the compromise PRIIPs Regulation.
32 Article 8 of the compromise PRIIPs Regulation.
33 Paper is the default medium for a KID where there is a face-to-face
communication, unless the investor requests otherwise.
34 Note that these conditions might prove difficult to meet when providing
the KID to a retail client.
35 See recent European case law on the accessibility of disclosure documents,
European Court of Justice (Timmel), C-359/12, 15 May 2014 (deciding, in
a case involving a prospectus, that “[...] the requirement that a prospectus
must be easily accessible on the website on which it is made available to the
public is not fulfilled where there is an obligation to register on that website,
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The detail on the method and conditions for providing disclo-
sure is intended to be further developed in Level 2 measures.
The Regulation provides that PRIIP manufacturers need to
publish the KID on their websites.36 Therefore, product pro-
viders will need to set up dedicated KID websites to host the
library of KIDs for their PRIIPs.
4. Additional interesting provisions
Product manufacturers and distributors must put in place
effective procedures which will allow investors to submit com-
plaints to manufacturers.
The Regulation gives national regulators product interven-
tion powers (where they did not have these already) to ban or
restrict the marketing, distribution or sale of particular
PRIIPs. In practice, this extends the product intervention
powers in MiFID II to any PRIIPs that would not otherwise
fall under the ambit of MiFID II, i.e., essentially IBI products.
Marketing communications that contain specific information
relating to the PRIIP shall not include any statement that
contradicts the information contained in the KID or dimi-
nishes the significance of the KID. Marketing communica-
tions shall indicate that a KID is available and supply infor-
mation on how and from where to obtain it, including the
manufacturer’s website.
Further to the Regulation, manufacturers/remanufacturers
are liable where a retail investor suffers loss as a result of
relying on a KID where the KID is (a) inconsistent with
binding pre-contractual or contractual documentation, (b)
misleading or inaccurate or (c) does not comply with the
required form and content requirements as set out in Article 8
of the Regulation. There is no longer the concept of a “reverse
burden of proof,” which was included in the Commission’s
proposal, whereby the product manufacturer would be liable
unless it could show that the KID complied with the content
requirements of the Regulation. Having in mind the require-
ment relating to the use of plain language, it is likely to be
challenging for product manufacturers/remanufacturers to
find a balance which satisfies the intention behind the Regu-
lation while at the same time ensuring they are protected in
the event of a retail investor claim. Civil liability of a manu-
facturer in relation to the KID will remain a matter of national
law.
The Regulation provides that administrative sanctions and
measures shall be put in place in case of breach of specific
provisions, including prohibition/suspension of marketing of
a PRIIP, a public warning, minimum administrative pecu-
niary sanctions, prohibition of provision of a non-compliant
KID. Member States shall ensure that, where the competent
authorities have imposed one or more administrative penal-
ties and other measures, the competent authorities have the
power to issue or require the PRIIP manufacturer or perso-
n advising on or selling the PRIIP to issue a direct communi-
cation to the retail investor concerned, giving them informa-
tion about the administrative measure
or administrative sanction, and informing them where to
lodge complaints or submit claims for redress. Member States
shall provide whistle blowers’ protection and publication of
the name of the liable person, subject to exemptions where,
for example, such disclosure would not be proportionate or
would jeopardize the stability of the financial markets.
5. Interaction with other disclosure
requirements
The European Commission intends the KID to serve a speci-
fic purpose different to other disclosure requirements. There-
fore, the KID will exist in parallel to the disclosure require-
ments under the other directives, including under the
prospectus directive (“PD”), the Solvency II directive, IMD
2, 37 and MiFID II.38
6. Next step
At the time of writing, the Council of the European Union
still needed to adopt the text of the Regulation. But, as the
text has already been agreed with the European Parliament,
this step should just be a formality. Shortly after this, the
Regulation will be published in the Official Journal, and will
come into legal force two years later. The European Commis-
sion stated on 14 April 2014 that it expects KIDs to be in place
by the end of 2015.39 However, it is more realistic that it will
come into force by mid-2016. In the meantime, the European
supervisory authorities will prepare draft RTS for approval
by the European Commission.
7. Assessment
The Regulation will have a substantial impact on the
documentation used in offerings of structured products to
retail investors in the European Union.
It is difficult to see how the complex structures that can sit
behind packaged/structured products and their opacity can be
broken down and explained in order to show their true likely
return and risks. It is being left to the Level 2 measures to
determine how risks and costs and returns can be disclosed in
a consistent manner. As in many other cases, the burden to
draft appropriate detailed rules relies on the European super-
visory authorities.
Besides, given the vast array of products that are caught by
the Regulation, it is questionable whether standardization of
disclosure can be achieved in any meaningful way and, if so,
whether the KID will be helpful or whether it will further
confuse retail investors.
Moreover, imposing a KID in addition to the summary pros-
pectus or any other similar disclosure requirement under
another financial market directive seems to run counter to the
objective of providing a more level playing field between
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
entailing acceptance of a disclaimer and the obligation to provide an email
address, where a charge is made for that electronic access or where consul-
tation of parts of the prospectus free of charge is restricted to two documents
per month”).
36 Article 5.1 and Article 9 of the compromise PRIIPs Regulation.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
37 As PRIIPs include IBI products which are covered by IMD 2.
38 As PRIIPs include structured deposits and other financial products that
are covered by MiFID II.
39 See European Commission, Key Information Documents (KIDs) for pac-
kaged retail investment and insurance products - Frequently asked ques-
tions, 15 April 2014. Be reminded that as a European Regulation, it will be
directly and uniformly applicable in all Member States, without the need
for national implementing measures.
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different types of products. It also seems unnecessarily confu-
sing that in some instances investors will receive two different
types of summaries, which are both intended to set out key
features and risks of the product.40 The European Commis-
sion seems conscious of the problem and has indicated that it
is open to addressing the case for removing duplication across
disclosure requirements in the future. In the meantime howe-
ver, manufacturers will need to review all disclosures for each
investment product, to ensure consistency.
It is intended that the Regulation will be reviewed within four
years to assess its impact. The European Commission is open
to widen the scope to other products, if necessary. We hope
that a costs-benefits assessment will be done at that stage and
that the European Commission will have the courage to
withdraw the KID if it is established that it did not meet its
objectives, i.e., that this prescriptive approach increases admi-
nistrative costs to the detriment of investors, without necessa-
rily aiding comparability across different sectors.
III. MiFID II/MiFIR
1. Background
The European Commission adopted on 20 October 2011 two
proposals for the review of the first directive on markets in
financial instruments (“MiFID” I). The new measures have
recently been published in the Official Journal and are known
as MiFID II41 and MiFIR.42
MiFID II/MiFIR contain over 100 requirements for ESMA to
draft RTS and Implementing Technical Standards (“ITS”),
and to provide Technical Advice to the European Commis-
sion to allow it to adopt delegated acts. ESMA published a
consultation paper on technical advice (the “CP”)43 which
was open to consultation until 1st August 2014. ESMA will
finalize the draft technical advice for submission to the Com-
mission by December 2014. The investor protection section is
the longest part of the CP comprising some 150 odd pages.
2. Scope
The European Commission recognised in a November 2010
Consultation that it would be preferable to amend MiFID I
and the first Insurance Mediation Directive (“IMD” I) to
address the PRIPs issues on sales rules.44 Consequently, it
suggested in its proposal of the MiFID review making more
uniform regulatory treatment concerning the distribution of
different packaged retail investment products in order to
ensure an adequate level of investor protection across the
European Union, and notably included structured deposits in
the scope of MiFID II.
Even if investments that involve contracts of insurance are
often made available to customers as potential alternatives or
substitutes to financial instruments subject to MiFID, and
therefore require investor protection provisions equal to
those provided in MiFID, it was decided that the different
market structures and product characteristics of IBI products
make it more appropriate that detailed requirements are set
out in the ongoing review of the Insurance Mediation Direc-
tive (“IMD I”) rather than setting them in MiFID II.45
3. Disclosure requirements
Investment firms must provide fair, clear and not misleading
information to (potential) clients and the conditions set out in
the MiFID implementing directive only apply to (potential)
retail clients. One of the objectives of the MiFID review was
to improve, where appropriate, the treatment of non-retail
clients, i.e., professional clients and eligible counterparties.
Consequently, ESMA suggested extending some of the prin-
ciples to professional clients for information addressed to or
likely to be received by them.46
In addition, ESMA noted that there were some deficiencies in
the information provided to retail clients.47 Consequently,
ESMA suggested the strengthening for retail clients of the
conditions for the information to be fair, clear and not mislea-
ding.48
Among the new disclosure requirements, we can note the
following pre-contractual information obligations. Appro-
priate information shall be provided in good time49 to clients
or potential clients with regard to the investment firm and its
services, the financial instruments and proposed investment
strategies, execution venues and all costs and related charges.
That information shall include, when investment advice is
provided, (a) whether or not the advice is provided on an
independent basis ; (b) whether the advice is based on a broad
or on a more restricted analysis of different types of financial
instruments and, in particular, whether the range is limited to
financial instruments issued or provided by entities having
close links with the investment firm or any other legal or
economic relationships, such as contractual relationships, so
close as to pose a risk of impairing the independent basis of
the advice provided ; (c) whether the investment firm will
provide the client with a periodic assessment of the suitability• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
40 For instance, issuers of structured securities issued to retail investors under
a PD-compliant prospectus will have to ensure that both a KID and an
issuance-specific summary – required by the PD – are produced.
41 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending directive
2002/92/EC and directive 2011/61/EU (recast), OJ, 12 June 2014, L 173/
349.
42 Regulation N° 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending regulation
n° 648/2012, OJ, 12 June 2014, L 173/84.
43 See ESMA, Consultation paper MiFID II/MiFIR, 22 May 2014, 2014/549.
ESMA also published a discussion paper on the draft RTS/ITS (ESMA,
Discussion paper MiFID/MiFIR, 22 May 2014, 2014/548) which was also
open to consultation until 1st August 2014.
44 See Consultation by Commission Services on legislative steps for the
Packaged Retail Investment Products initiative, 26 November 2010
(closed on 31 January 2011).
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
45 Recitals (87) MiFID II.
46 ESMA, CP, at 92-93 (information, including marketing communications,
should be accurate and not reference any potential benefit without giving a
fair and prominent indication of any relevant risks ; it shall not disguise,
diminish or obscure important items, statements or warnings ; and it
should be up-to-date, relevant to the method of communication used).
47 ESMA, CP, at 91 ((a) the language of different documents sent to retail
clients is not always consistent ; (b) information provided by investment
firms is not always updated, even when provided online ; (c) the presenta-
tion of risks/warnings to clients does not always reflect the particular
relevance of these pieces of information ; and (d) information about the
future performance does not illustrate sufficiently the potential functio-
ning of the financial instruments or services).
48 ESMA, CP, at 93 (answering the concerns raised in the previous footnote).
49 See for more details recital (83) and recital (84) MiFID II.
RTDF N° 3 - 2014 u DOCTRINE / Gaëtane Schaeken Willemaers 5
DOCTRINE
of the financial instruments recommended to that client. The
information on financial instruments and proposed invest-
ment strategies must include appropriate guidance on and
warnings of the risks associated with investments in those
instruments or in respect of particular investment strategies
and whether the financial instrument is intended for retail or
professional clients, taking account of the identified target
market. The information on all costs and associated charges
must include information relating to both investment and
ancillary services, including the cost of advice, where relevant,
the cost of the financial instrument recommended or marke-
ted to the client and how the client may pay for it, also
encompassing any third-party payments. The information
about all costs and charges, including costs and charges in
connection with the investment service and the financial ins-
trument, which are not caused by the occurrence of under-
lying market risk, shall be aggregated to allow the client to
understand the overall cost as well as the cumulative effect on
return of the investment, and where the client so requests, an
itemised breakdown shall be provided. Where applicable,
such information shall be provided to the client on a regular
basis, at least annually, during the life of the investment.50
ESMA is advocating that the aggregated amount in costs
should be stated both as a total amount and as a percentage.
That pre-contractual information can be presented on a stan-
dardized format to clients, should that possibility be provided
by national law.51
Member States may impose, in exceptional cases, additional
requirements provided that they are objectively justified and
proportionate so as to address specific risks to investor pro-
tection or to market integrity which are of particular impor-
tance in the circumstances of the market structure of that
Member State. A specific procedure of notification to the
Commission must be followed. Such additional requirements
shall not restrict or otherwise affect the provision of services
on the basis of the free movement of services or the establish-
ment of a branch.52
4. Product governance
arrangements/organizational requirements –
Know your product
Investment firms must act in accordance with the best inte-
rests of their clients and avoid conflicts of interests.
In that context, manufacturers shall have and periodically
review a process for the approval of each financial instrument
and for significant adaptations of existing financial instru-
ments before marketing or distributing to clients.53 The pro-
duct approval process shall (a) specify an identified target
market of end clients ; 54 (b) ensure that the financial instru-
ments are designed to meet the needs of the identified target
market55 and therefore assess all relevant risks to such market
and make sure that the target market is able to bear those
risks ; (c) ensure that the distribution strategy is compatible
with the target market56 and take reasonable steps to ensure
that the financial instrument is distributed to the target mar-
ket.57 Manufacturers shall regularly review the financial ins-
truments it offers or markets, including whether the financial
instrument remains consistent with the needs of the identified
target market and whether the distribution strategy remains
appropriate.58
Product governance arrangements will apply to firms that
manufacture products as well as firms that sell financial pro-
ducts. An investment firm shall assess the compatibility of the
financial instruments with the needs of the clients to whom it
provides investment services, also taking account of the iden-
tified target market, to ensure that the financial instruments
are offered or recommended only when this is in the interest
of the client.59 To that end, the manufacturer shall make
available to its distributors all information on the product and
the product approval process, including the identified target
market.60 An investment firm that does not manufacture the
products it markets shall have the adequate arrangements to
get the information and to understand the characteristics of
the product.61
In its CP, 62 ESMA suggested ways to detail the product
governance obligations of manufacturers and distributors. In
particular, at the manufacturer’s level, ESMA suggested that
the design of the product be compliant with the requirements
relating to the management of conflicts of interest (including
remuneration) ; staff have the necessary expertise or appro-
priate training to understand the characteristics and risks of
the products they want to manufacture ; 63 the management
body have effective control over the firm’s product gover-
nance process ; the group of investors for whose needs, objec-
tives, characteristics the product is not compatible be identi-
fied ; and the products be submitted to stress-test.64 At the
distributor’s level, the product governance obligations apply
when deciding the range of products distributors intend to
provide to clients. Distributors should have product gover-
nance arrangements in place (regularly reviewed) to ensure
that the products or services they intend to offer are compa-
tible with the characteristics, objectives and needs of the
identified target market ; should regularly review the pro-
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
50 Article 24.4 MiFID II.
51 Article 24.5 MiFID II.
52 Article 24.12 MiFID II.
53 Article 16.3 MiFID II. See as well, IOSCO, Regulation of retail structured
products, Final Report, December 2013, at 19-20 (regulatory tool 5 (pro-
duct approval process)).
54 See as well regulatory tool 3 (intended investor identification and assess-
ment) of IOSCO report, at 16-17.
55 See FSA, Retail product development and governance – structured pro-
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
duct review, FG12/09, March 2012. See as well, ESMA/2014/332, Opinion,
27 March 2014, at 6 (structured products should meet the financial needs,
investment objectives, knowledge and experience of the target market ;
compliance function should be involved in the design process ; avoidance
of conflicts of interest ; an external party to challenge the pricing, valua-
tion, and risk/reward trade-off relative to the target market).
56 Article 24.2 MiFID II. See as well, IOSCO, Regulation of retail structured
products, Final Report, December 2013, at 28 (regulatory tool 14 (distri-
bution channel considerations)).
57 Article 24.2 MiFID II.
58 Article 16.3 and Article 24.2 MiFID II. See as well ESMA CP, at 44
(product review and the discussion of its frequency).
59 Article 24.2 MiFID II.
60 Article 16.3 MiFID II.
61 Article 16.3 and Article 24.2 MiFID II. See also ESMA CP, at 45.
62 See as well in that respect the consultation paper of the European Com-
mission prior to adopting MiFID II (European Commission, Public
Consultation - Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, 8
December 2010, at 68).
63 See as well ESMA/2014/332, Opinion, 27 March 2014, at 5.
64 See as well IOSCO, Regulation of retail structured products, Final Report,
December 2013, at 18 (regulatory tool 4 (use of financial modeling)). See
for more details on stress-testing, ESMA, Trends, Risks, Vulnerabilities,
12 March 2014, 2014/0188, at 63 et seq.
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ducts they market ; should have trained staff that understand
the products ; should provide manufacturers with sales infor-
mation to support product reviews by manufacturers ; should
involve the compliance function in the development and
review of product governance arrangements and the manage-
ment body in the endorsement of the products and services
offered. Where there are multiple intermediaries in the chain,
the final distributor has ultimate responsibility to meet the
product governance obligations. The intermediate distributor
must ensure that the relevant information is passed from the
manufacturer to the final distributor and that the manufactu-
rer is provided with all information he needs on product sales,
and he must apply the product governance arrangements for
manufacturers in relation to the service it provides.
5. Product intervention powers65
MiFIR introduces a framework for product intervention in
order to enable national competent authorities and ESMA, 66
provided that certain conditions are met and in the circums-
tances specified by ESMA, to “temporarily” prohibit or res-
trict the marketing, distribution or sale of certain financial
instruments or structured deposits or financial instruments or
structured deposits with certain specified features or a type of
financial activity or practice.67
ESMA shall only take a decision to prohibit or restrict if all of
the following conditions are fulfilled : (a) the proposed action
addresses a significant investor protection concern or a threat
to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or
to the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in
the Union ; (b) regulatory requirements under European
legislation that are applicable to the relevant financial instru-
ment or activity do not address the threat ; (c) a competent
authority or competent authorities have not taken action to
address the threat or actions that have been taken do not
adequately address the threat.
ESMA may impose the prohibition or restriction on a precau-
tionary basis before a financial instrument has been marke-
ted, distributed or sold to clients.
When taking action, ESMA shall take into account the extent
to which the action (a) does not have a detrimental effect on
the efficiency of financial markets or on investors that is
disproportionate to the benefits of the action ; and (b) does
not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage. Before deciding to
take any action, ESMA shall notify competent authorities of
the action it proposes. ESMA shall publish on its website
notice of any decision to take any action. The notice shall
specify details of the prohibition or restriction and specify a
time after the publication of the notice from which the measu-
res will take effect. As provided under ESMA Regulation, 68
ESMA shall review a prohibition or restriction imposed at
appropriate intervals and at least every three months. Poten-
tially, the prohibition or restriction could last indefinitely if
properly renewed. If the prohibition or restriction is not
renewed after that three month period it shall expire. Action
adopted by ESMA shall prevail over any previous action
taken by a competent authority. The European Commission
shall adopt by means of delegated acts measures specifying
criteria and factors to be taken into account by ESMA in
determining when the threats to investor protection or to the
orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets and to
the stability of the whole or part of the financial system of the
Union arise. Those criteria and factors shall include (a) the
degree of complexity of a financial instrument and the rela-
tion to the type of client to whom it is marketed and sold ; (b)
the size or the notional value of an issuance of financial
instruments ; (c) the degree of innovation of a financial instru-
ment, an activity or a practice ; (d) the leverage a financial
instrument or practice provides.
ESMA suggested details of the criteria in its CP, stressing that
flexibility is key in this new area and the list of criteria should
be a non-exhaustive one. ESMA also made it clear that fre-
quency of intervention should be limited, given the many
conditions attached ; and expects the product governance
principles to limit the need for product intervention as well.
6. Sanctions
MiFID II strengthens the existing regime to ensure effective
and harmonized administrative sanctions.69 The use of crimi-
nal sanctions is framed so as to ensure the cooperation
between authorities and the transparency of sanctions. Lastly,
a harmonized system of strengthened cooperation will
improve the effective detection of breaches of MiFID.70
7. Next step
MiFID II and MiFIR came into force on 2 July 2014. At the
time of writing, it is said that ESMA is expected to finalize its
technical advice for the delegated acts in December 2014. It
should submit its final RTS to the European Commission in
June 2015 and the final ITS in December 2015. Member States
will need to adopt and publish the domestic legislation neces-
sary to transpose MiFID II by 2 July 2016. Such legislation
and MiFIR will then apply from 2 January 2017.
8. Assessment
Details on the disclosure requirements will be set out in
Commission’s delegated acts. In that respect, MiFID II expli-
citly states that account shall be taken of “any relevant stan-
dardized information required under Union law” when for-
mulating the requirements for information on financial
instruments, including information on the structure of the
product.71 This is of course welcome to avoid duplication in
pre-contractual standard disclosure documents.
As the PRIIPs Regulation and MiFID II contain disclosure
requirements, ideally, the disclosures required by both would
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
65 In a narrow acceptance, product intervention refers to the rules dealing
with the design and the structure of investment products. It comes next to
the set of regulations concerning disclosure and distribution of investment
products. In a broader sense, it refers to any regulatory intervention with
respect to financial products (e.g., restricting in any way their marketing).
This section deals with the latter.
66 This applies as well to the European Banking Authority (“EBA”) under
Article 41 MiFIR.
67 Articles 40 and 42 MiFIR.
68 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a Euro-
pean Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Autho-
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
rity), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission
Decision 2009/77/EC, Official Journal, 15 December 2010, L 331/84.
69 See Article 70.6 MiFID II and also Article 71 MiFID II (publication of
decisions and measures as a general rule).
70 Article 79 et seq. MiFID II.
71 Article 24.13, in fine MiFID II.
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have overlapped. But in many respects, they do not. There
will be implementation challenges for firms in reconciling the
different rules. For example :
where structured deposits are sold, MiFID II disclosure requi-
rements are set to apply, as structured deposits are not caught
by the PRIIPs Regulation, whereas where personal pensions
are sold, the PRIIPs Regulation requirements will apply, as
these are not encompassed by MiFID II ;
the MiFID II disclosures are likely to apply where any "finan-
cial instruments" are sold to any type of clients.72 The PRIIPs
Regulation disclosures however are only required where
investment products are sold to retail clients ;
where products within scope of both national legislation (such
as the UK Retail Distribution Review) and MiFID II (e.g.,
structured products) are sold to retail clients, the national
supervisory authority could apply the national requirements.
This is because MiFID II does not prohibit Member States
from imposing stricter rules.
Most financial institutions already have some sort of product
approval process in place. They will have now to see if addi-
tional measures need to be taken to adapt their existing
processes and policies to the new European requirements in
that respect. This being said, even if everything has been done
to implement each formal requirement of applicable regula-
tions, it will be worth nothing if there is not a strong will inside
each manufacturer and each distributor to adopt ethos, and to
convey it to each of their employees, to really work in the best
interests of clients. It seems that what is still lacking today is a
change of culture to make finance really work for the benefit
of society.
IV. IMD 2
1. Background
Even though the insurance sector came out of the financial
crisis reasonably well – with the notable exception of AIG – it
however had its own raft of regulatory and political attention
at national, European and global level. The major regulatory
change for insurers in the European Union is the implemen-
tation of the Solvency II directive which will determine how
much capital an insurer will need. In addition, the Solvency II
directive calls upon the European Commission to revise IMD
I, taking into account the consequences of Solvency II for
policyholders.
On 3 July 2012, the European Commission adopted a propo-
sal of IMD 2, which is today at the stage of Presidency com-
promise.73
The goal of the Commission’s proposal is to upgrade consu-
mer protection in the insurance sector by creating common
standards across insurance sales and ensuring proper advice.
Compared to IMD I, IMD 2 provides for, inter alia, more
detailed professional requirements74 as well as new conduct
of business rules.75 In addition, further to MiFID II, additio-
nal customer protection provisions are introduced in connec-
tion with IBI products as these products are considered
potential alternatives or substitutes to products subject to
MiFID.76 These provisions are further detailed in IMD 2.77
An IBI product is defined as “an insurance product which
offers a maturity or surrender value and where that maturity or
surrender value is wholly or partially exposed, directly or
indirectly, to market fluctuations”. This indicates that an IBI
product would need to include an investment component that
is expected to provide a variable rate of return. This would be
likely to cover unit-linked and index linked contracts, fixed
index annuities and variable annuities. In addition to the
non-life insurance products listed in Annex I to Solvency II,
the following are excluded from the definition of an IBI
product : life insurance contracts where the benefits under the
contract are payable only on death or in respect of incapacity
due to injury, sickness or infirmity ; pension products which,
under national law, are recognised as having the primary
purpose of providing the investor with an income in retire-
ment, and which entitles the investor to certain benefits ;
officially recognised occupational pension schemes falling
under the scope of the Occupational Pension Funds Directive
or the Solvency II directive ; individual pension products for
which a financial contribution from the employer is required
by national law and where the employer or the employee has
no choice as to the pension product or provider.78
2. Disclosure requirements
As all other customer protection provisions of IMD 2, the
pre-contractual information requirements apply to “insu-
rance distribution” activity carried out by insurance interme-
diaries or insurance and re-insurance undertakings that sell
directly to customers. Just a few exceptions are provided.79
Following the IMD definition of insurance distribution, this
includes the following : (a) introducing, proposing or carrying
out other work preparatory to the conclusion of a contract,
(b) concluding a contract or (c) assisting in the administration
and performance of a contract, in particular in the event of a
claim.
All information, including marketing communications,
addressed by the distributor to (potential) customers must be
fair, clear and not misleading. Marketing communications
must be clearly identifiable as such. The conditions with which
information must comply to be fair, clear and not misleading
will be detailed in Level 2 measures, as well as the content and
format of pre-contractual information.80
Prior to the conclusion of a contract, whether or not advice is
given, a retail customer shall be given free of charge the
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
72 See however the possibility to make distinctions in the level 2 measures.
73 The presidency compromise on which this article relies is the one dated 20
June 2014, available on the Internet website of the documents from the
Council of the European Union.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
74 Chapter V IMD 2.
75 Chapter VI IMD 2.
76 Article 91 MiFID II amending IMD I. In autumn 2013, EIOPA requested
that provisions on the sale of insurance PRIPS be included in the MiFID II
as negotiations on IMD 2 were not progressing very rapidly.
77 Chapter VII IMD 2.
78 Article 2 (4) IMD 2.
79 See Article 19 IMD 2 (exceptions include mediation in the insurance of
large risks, mediation by re-insurance undertakings/intermediaries ; or in
relation to professional customers).
80 Article 15 IMD 2.
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relevant information about the insurance product in a com-
prehensible form to allow the customer to make an informed
decision, while taking into account the complexity of the
insurance product and the type of customer.81 IMD 2 also
provides for specific pieces of pre-contractual information to
be provided to retail customers by the insurance interme-
diary, the ancillary insurance distributor or the insurance
undertaking, as the case may be.82 The form of the disclosure,
83 the means of communication84 and the language are also
detailed.85
The information requirements of IMD 2 provide for mini-
mum harmonization. Member States could provide stricter
rules provided that such rules comply with Union law.86
Breach of the information requirements provisions must be
sanctioned by administrative sanctions and measures.
3. Product governance
arrangements/organizational requirements –
Know your product
Insurance manufacturers shall maintain, operate and review a
process for the approval of each insurance product or signifi-
cant adaptations of an existing insurance product before it is
marketed or distributed to customers.
The product approval process shall specify an identified tar-
get market of customers for each product and ensure that all
relevant risks to such identified target market are assessed,
the intended distribution strategy is consistent with the iden-
tified target market and take reasonable steps to ensure that
the insurance product is distributed to the identified target
market.
The insurance undertaking shall understand and regularly
review the insurance products it offers or markets, taking into
account any event that could materially affect the potential
risk to the identified target market, to assess at least whether
the product remains consistent with the needs of the identi-
fied target market and whether the intended distribution
strategy remains appropriate.
Insurance manufacturers shall make available to any distribu-
tor all appropriate information on the insurance product and
the product approval process, including the identified target
market of the insurance product. Where an insurance distri-
butor advices on or proposes insurance products which it does
not manufacture, it shall have in place adequate arrange-
ments to obtain the information and to understand the cha-
racteristics and identified target market of each insurance
product.87
4. Professional requirements
IMD 2 provides for professional knowledge and competence
requirements for natural persons carrying out insurance or
re-insurance distribution. Specific ones are provided for IBI
products in Annex II to the directive. These requirements
should be met on a permanent basis and update of professio-
nal knowledge and competence should take place regularly.88
Breach of the professional requirements provisions must be
sanctioned by administrative sanctions and measures.
5. Sanctions and measures
Further to IMD 2, effective, proportionate and dissuasive
administrative sanctions and measures must be put in place ;
sanctions must be applied to members of the management
body ; all necessary investigatory powers must be made
available to competent authorities. Publication of a sanction
must become the rule and anonymous publication is provided
for in certain circumstances. IMD 2 provides a list of adminis-
trative sanctions and measures and a list of the breaches to
which they apply. It also introduces provisions on whistle
blowing.89
6. Interaction with MiFID II and the PRIIPs
Regulation
The European Commission recognised that competing pro-
ducts can originate from various providers where sectors can
be blurred. It noted that IBI products compete with products
from other sectors covered by securities regulation, i.e.,
MiFID. This links the negotiations over IMD 2 to both
MiFID II90 and the PRIIPs Regulation.91
7. Next step
IMD 2 is currently expected to be implemented in 2014 and to
come into force in 2016.
8. Assessment
One might regret that instead of having one code to regulate
the European markets for financial products and services, we
still have sectoral regulations. In particular, MiFID II/MiFIR
on the one hand and IMD 2 on the other hand regulate the
same topics, each with its specific scope (non-insurance v
insurance). The PRIIPs Regulation stands out as a regulation
which regulates pre-contractual information for all packaged
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
81 Article 15a.4 IMD 2 (for insurance intermediaries), Article 15b (for
ancillary insurance distributors), Article 15c.5 (for insurance underta-
kings) and Article 24.8 (with respect to IBI). See also Article 19.1 for the
limited exceptions (professional customers, reinsurance intermediaries
and reinsurance undertakings, large risks).
82 Including, for instance, whether advice is given, the complaint procedure,
whether it acts independently or not, the nature and the method of calcu-
lation of the remuneration.
83 Clear and accurate manner, comprehensible to the customer.
84 Paper is the default medium.
85 Article 20 IMD 2.
86 Article 19.2 IMD 2. It seems that individual national regulators want to
retain the right to play a significant role in the regulation of insurance
products and be able to respond to local market (and political) pressures.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
87 Article 21a IMD 2. See also recital (37) IMD 2 stating that “The insurance
intermediary should be able to explain to the customer the key features of the
insurance products it sells”.
88 At least 50 hours in 5 consecutive years.
89 Articles 26 et seq. IMD 2.
90 MiFID does not cover insurance products.
91 The PRIIPs Regulation governs the disclosure requirements for, inter alia,
IBI products.
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investment products, whatever their form, be they insurance-
related or not. This situation of having different regulations
regulating the same topics each for different types of products
or different contexts92 leads to additional costs for firms sub-
ject to these regulations. For sure the compliance function
within those firms has a bright future ahead. Inconsistencies
or small differences between different regulations will require
legal advice to ensure full compliance. This leads to an uneven
playing field across sectors which runs contrary to the objec-
tive of promoting competition to avoid regulatory arbitrage,
where market participants structure products so as to mini-
mise their regulatory obligations, and to motivate financial
institutions to improve their products to suit clients’ demands.
One might have hoped to have the same conduct-of-business
and organizational rules to apply to all distributors of invest-
ment products available at retail level.
V. Conclusions
We note that, today, most regulators and regulations assimi-
late clients of financial products or users of financial services
to “financial consumers”.93 This is definitely an evolution that
reflects a change of mind. But is this just window dressing in
the urge of restoring investors’ trust in financial markets after
the 2007-2008 crisis ?94 Or are the European regulations exa-
mined in this contribution really likely to meet their objective
of increased clients’ protection on financial markets ? This is a
question worth asking.
For long, and definitely before MiFID I, disclosure to provide
investors the information that they need to understand their
financial products and make informed decisions was believed
to be the panacea to cure the variety of investors’ pain and
suffering in the financial market. As the effectiveness of dis-
closure became highly dubious, 95 the insistence on the part of
European policy makers to continue its extensive use96 is
peculiar, particularly in the retail financial product market.
To be sure, one cannot totally dismiss disclosure as a financial
user’s protection tool. Disclosure is useful where it meets its
objectives and this can only be assessed through real costs-
benefits analyses taking target markets’ opinions into
account. We note in that respect that much remains to be
done in terms of involvement of target markets’ representati-
ves at the discussions and drafting table to ensure that the
objectives are met in practice.97
Disclosure obligations will certainly not meet their objectives
if the people they are meant to protect do not understand the
information provided to them. In that respect, it is worth
noting the many initiatives in connection with financial lite-
racy.98 Unfortunately, it is true only to a certain extent that
one can educate investors to understand the risks of their
investments. Studies show that, like disclosure, the impact of
financial education programmes on investors’ understanding
of financial products is controversial.99
If bad decisions could reflect lack of information or lack of
knowledge, they could also reflect behavioural biases. This is
an avenue of research which should be more investigated than
it is now and which conclusions should be more often used to
design correct policies to protect investors.100
Recently, and even more so under MiFID II and IMD 2, given
the failures of disclosure, more focus has been allocated to
point-of-sale regulation. Regulatory emphasis seems now to
be set at the level of the distribution chain – manufacturer’s
responsibilities in the product design process, market testing,
stress testing, staff training, choice of distribution channel. We
certainly believe this is the right approach.
For the reasons explaining disclosure’s failures, investors tend
to rely heavily and passively on advice.101 This is a fact. In that
context, intermediaries’ competence and ability to unders-
tand the products and to give proper, appropriate and
unbiased advice taking only the interests of their specific
client into account becomes paramount. This will in turn
strengthen investors’ trust in professional and trustworthy
financial institutions.
Even if product governance arrangements are said to limit the
need for it, MiFIR and the PRIIPs Regulation provide for
product intervention by supervisory authorities as a response
to innovation risks. We believe that intervention in product
design or banning of financial products should remain a last
resort solution given the costs. While all innovation and
choice is not beneficial to investors, regulators should be
careful before they act as product intervention could stifle
innovation and slow down product development. Investments
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
92 Refer to the example given above of the summary under the prospectus
directive and the KID under the PRIIPs Regulation.
93 See OECD, G20 high-level principles on financial consumer protection,
October 2011 ; ESMA, annual report 2013 ; Belgian Financial Services and
Markets Authority, mission statement (“The Financial Services and Mar-
kets Authority strives to ensure the honest and equitable treatment of finan-
cial consumers and the integrity of the financial markets”).
94 Note that the level of trust vis-à-vis investment services providers and
relating to compliance with investors protection rules is rather low in the
European Union (33 % in 2012 according to ESMA, Trends, Risks, Vul-
nerabilities, 12 March 2014, 2014/0188, at 28).
95 See Gaëtane Schaeken Willemaers, The EU Issuer-Disclosure Regime :
Objectives and Proposals for Reform, Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands,
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011. See also, Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl
E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV
647, 735–42 (2011).
96 See for instance the PRIIPs Regulation.
97 See Better Finance, “London, 4 June 2014 : the European financial consu-
mer exclusion day ?”, press release, June 2014 (criticizing the European
Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”) for the very limited involvement of
financial services users at the “financial consumer protection day” they
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
organized and the absence from the agenda of such day of the main
regulatory issues currently on the table of the ESAs regarding investor and
financial user protection).
98 See at international level (OECD 2005), European level (European Com-
mission communication 2007 and European Parliament resolution 2008)
and national level (e.g., Belgian FSMA since 2011).
99 Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 Iowa L. Rev.
197, 202–04 (2009). See Decision Technology Ltd, Consumer Decision-
Making in Retail Investment Services : A Behavioral Economics Perspec-
tive, Final Report, November 2010, at 390 (acknowledging the lack of
studies regarding if and to what extent it is possible to improve behavioral
traits through education or information campaigns).
100 One of the topics at the 2014 Joint ESAs Consumer Protection Day was
“behavioural economics/finance”. But unfortunately, none of the panel-
lists was from the consumers’ associations or specialists in this very specific
area of research. In Europe, a lot remains to be done to take the sentence
of Daniel Kahneman to its fullest width : “Although Humans are not
irrational, they often need help to make more accurate judgments and better
decisions, and in some cases policies and institutions can provide that help”
(Daniel Kahneman, Thinking fast and slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2011, at 411).
101 See Decision Technology Ltd, Consumer Decision-Making in Retail
Investment Services : A Behavioral Economics Perspective, Final Report,
November 2010 (concluding that “professional financial advice plays a key
role in the market” (at 21)). See as well Recital 36 of the draft IMD 2 (“Due
to the increasing dependence of consumers on personal recommendations
[...]”).
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inevitably involve risk. Complexity may be necessary for the
product to function as expected and might answer the needs
of specific investors. Structured products indicators are not
absolute determinants of detriment.102 As long as the product
is understood by the manufacturers and distributors alike and
that the product works to the best interests of the target
market for which it is created and as long as the investor
agrees with the risks fully and accurately disclosed to him/her,
complexity should not be banned.
The stricter conduct-of-business rules, product governance
arrangements and product intervention powers that we have
now reviewed imply that supervisory authorities have ade-
quate resources to supervise and intervene early enough in
the process. In that respect, the increase in ESMA staff is to be
welcomed.103
We would like to conclude by reminding a very simple,
although so often forgotten fact. Regulations will not be
effective in meeting their objective of clients’ protection on
financial markets if manufacturers and distributors lack ethos
in their way of doing business. As experience shows, financial
and insurance institutions do know the tricks to circumvent
the purpose of regulatory provisions. It is now time to restore
what has been lost (if it has ever existed) in too many financial
markets players : a culture reflecting a strong commitment to
offer products that work in the best interests of their clients.
And this can only happen with a strong and sincere will from
management as it needs proper motivation and supervi-
sion. e
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
102 Accord, Better Finance, Better Finance Response to the Informal Consul-
tation of 14 May 2014 by OECD, at 3.
103 In order to keep up with the additional responsibilities and tasks that were
on ESMA’s plate in 2013, ESMA staff numbers grew by more than 50 % to
139 staff by the end of 2013. “Looking ahead at the long list of our
responsibilities and on-going and new tasks (whether under EMIR, MiFID
II or other legislative provisions), ESMA will need to continue to develop
existing and attract new staff, as well as continue to improve its organisatio-
nal effectiveness” (ESMA annual report 2013). See also the increase in staff
at the Belgian FSMA.
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